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MARITAL PRIVILEGES
Three separate rules of evidence regarding the marital relationship
developed during the early 1660's. The three rules were: (1) the incom-
petency of a spouse to testify in a civil or criminal action whether on
behalf of or against the other spouse; (2) the privilege of preventing one
spouse from testifying against the other (called by Wigmore the privilege
for anti-marital facts); and (3) the privilege of excluding from testimony
those communications between the spouses that are confidential.
COMMON LAW RULE OF INCOMPETENCY
The common law rule of incompetency' was based on the idea that
interested parties were not competent witnesses in their own cause and the
metaphysical belief that husband and wife were one.2 In England such free
thinkers as Jeremy Bentham waged a campaign against the rule,3 which
found England abolishing it during the 19th Century. Presently only twelve
jurisdictions in the United States have statutes that render spouses incom-
petent to testify on behalf of or against each other. These statutes are not
like the true common law incompetency. They are more similar to the
privilege against a spouse testifying against the other spouse.4
THE PRIVILEGE FOR ANTI-MARITAL FACTS
The result achieved under the privilege that prevents a spouse from
testifying against the other is the opposite of the common law incom-
petency rule. The common law incompetency rule prevented the spouse
from testifying at all. Under the anti-marital facts privilege, a spouse may
call the other to the witness stand and elicit testimony, thus waiving the
privilege. But if one spouse does not desire the other to testify against him,
he may claim the privilege and prevent her from testifying, on the ground
that this adverse testimony would tend to disrupt marital harmony. The
object being protected is the marriage itself rather than the parties to the
marriage. 5 The privilege exists in twenty-five states, but most of the juris-
1 See, e.g., I Blackstone Commentaries 443 (1765) "... (I)f they were admitted to be
witnesses for each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, nemo in propiro
causa testis esse debet . . ." (No one ought to be a witness in his own cause).
2 See Coke, Commentary Upon Littleton 6b (Hargrave 16th ed. 1809).
3 See Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 481 (Bowring ed. 1843).
4 See 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 206, 209 (1961).
5 Professor McCormick's comment on the existence of the marital privilege: "The
privilege has sometimes been defended after the manner in which we find reasons for
inherited customs generally, as protecting family harmony. But family harmony is nearly
always past saving when the spouse is willing to aid the prosecution. The privilege, in
truth, is an archaic survival of a mystical religious dogma and a way of thinking about
the marital relation, which is today outmoded." McCormick, Evidence § 66 (Hornbook
Series 1954) (hereinafter cited as McCormick).
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dictions have added a number of exceptions so that while the statute pro-
vides the privilege, it is rarely available, and when available, of little use.
6
THE PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
7
The third and soundest evidentiary rule concerning the marital rela-
tionship is the privilege for confidential communications. It is also the most
widely accepted of the evidentiary rules; forty-two American jurisdictions
have enacted statutes dealing with it.8 Due to the use of the common law
rule of incompetency and the privilege against anti-marital facts, this
privilege, even though in existence since 1684,9 did not start being asserted
until 1853.10
McCormick mentions four principles that are the basis of the privilege
for confidential communications:
1) It is founded on a social policy of protecting the marital relation-
ship by preventing disclosure of confidences exchanged by persons occupy-
ing such status.
2) The privilege covers communications during marriage.
3) This privilege is not affected by statutes rendering spouses incom-
petent.
4) The privilege is limited to confidential communications.1 '
The privilege against anti-marital facts and the privilege for confiden-
tial communications are separate and distinct, as the four principles enu-
merated by Professor McCormick demonstrate. The anti-marital facts
privilege refers to communications between the spouses; the communica-
tions privilege only refers to confidential communications. Under the
anti-marital facts privilege even information that one of the spouses gained
outside of the marital relationship is privileged, whereas under the com-
munications privilege, the spouse is restricted to knowledge obtained on
account of the marital relationship. 12 Furthermore, the communications
6 Wigmore, Evidence § 2245 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter cited as Wigmore).
7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2332-2341 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCormick, Evidence
§ 82-90 (1954); 3 Jones, Evidence § 798-806 (4th ed. 1958); 3 Ford, Evidence § 304-306
(1935) 6 Callaghan, Illinois Evidence § 13.20-13.23 (1964); see generally 97 C.J.S. Witnesses
§ 75-104 and § 266-275 (1957); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 375-400 (1948).
8 See 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 206, 216-217 (1961).
9 Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 555 (1684).
10 The first official recognition of the marital confidential privilege came in the
Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 which stated: ".... (N)o husband shall be compellable
to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during marriage and no wife
shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during
the marriage." 16 and 17 Vict. Ch. 83, § 3.
11 McCormick § 82.
12 8 Wigmore § 2334.
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privilege still exists after death or divorce, but the anti-marital facts privi-
lege does not.
The underlying policy basis of the privilege for confidential communi-
cations is the importance society places upon the institution of marriage,
the basis of the family unit. Consequently, the courts frown upon anything
that tends to disrupt a marriage. The privilege enables the spouses to
develop the necessary confidence in each other, which is the foundation of
a stable marriage. A free exchange of ideas between the spouses is the goal
of such a privilege. 13 Also, the very thought of a husband or wife being
compelled to testify against the other is repulsive to our notions of fair play.
HOLDER OF THE PRIVILEGE
That the privilege is available only to the marriage partner and not
to third parties is without doubt.14 But is the privilege available only to the
communicator, or is it available to both the communicator and the com-
municatee? The privilege is usually granted solely to the communicator of
the confidential communication,' 5 but on occasion it has been accorded to
both.16 Granting the privilege to both is not a sound policy since the com-
municating spouse is the one interested in whether the message is kept
confidential. The recipient has no control over what flows from the com-
municator's lips; if the communicator later desires to make public his
utterances, the communicatee has no valid basis on which to object. Look-
ing at the intent of the privilege, which is to secure freedom from appre-
hension in the mind of the one who communicates, 17 we can clearly see that
the holder of the privilege should be the communicator and not both the
communicator and the communicatee.
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
The Illinois Legislature in 1935 amended Section 5 of the Evidence
Act18 and in 1937 it amended Section 6 of Division 13 of the Criminal
13 McCormick points out that the vast majority of marriage partners never know of
this privilege and would not act differently if they did know of it. McCormick § 90.
14 Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825 (1943) (in a murder prosecution the
court held that a third person could not claim the privilege that applies to confidential
communications between the spouses).
15 Wigmore § 2340 (1).
16 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (1943) aff'd., 138 F.2d 831 (1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944), rehearing denied, 322 U.S. 768 (1944) (the case involved a
prosecution for an alleged violation of the Mann Act. The court held that the privilege
for confidential communications applies to both spouses, but the testimony was admissible
if one spouse waived the privilege).
17 Supra, note 15.
18 The amended statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 51, § 5 (1966), reads as follows: "In all
civil actions, husband and wife may testify as to any communication or admission made
by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during coverture,
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Code; 19 as amended, these two statutes are substantially the same. The
statutes removed the complete spousal incompetency of early common law
and retained only the common law privilege relating to communications
between the spouses. Unfortunately, the proviso which disqualified the
husband and wife in matters relating to "any communication or admission
... or any conversation . . . during coverture", left much to be desired.20
Such language has in some jurisdictions been construed to confine the
privilege to any communication between the spouses21 while the other juris-
dictions have construed the same language to be applicable only to confi-
dential communications. 22
Until 1955, the Illinois courts construed the language of the proviso to
mean incompetency to testify rather than as a privilege, and also applied
the incompetency to any communication between the spouses, not simply
ronfidential communications. 23
In Zaremba v. Skurdialis,24 the Illinois Supreme Court took a step
forward by reversing a decision holding that an ex-wife could not testify
on behalf of the defendant ex-husband in a suit for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation as to matters not touching on the confidential
relationship between husband and wife. Thus, impliedly, the Court recog-
except in actions between such husband and wife, and in actions where the custody or
support of their children is directly in issue, and as to matters in which either has
acted as agent for the other."
19 The part of the amended statute pertaining to husband and wife communica-
tions, I11. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 155 (1966) reads as follows: "In all criminal cases, husband
and wife may testify for or against each other; provided, that neither may testify as to
any communication or admission made by either of them to the other or as to any
conversation between them during coverture, except in cases where either is charged with
an offense against the person or property of the other, or in case of wife abandonment, or
where the interests of their child or children are directly involved, or as to matters in
which either has acted as agent of the other."
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 51, § 5 (1966) and I11. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38 § 155 (1966). Both
statutes contain the same proviso.
21 These following states hold all communications between the spouses to be
privileged: Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
22 The words "any communication" appear in the vast majority of state statutes,
and they are construed, as Illinois construed them, to mean only confidential communica-
tions. See Broomer, Spousal Testimony 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 259, 292-296 (1962) (the
article contains an excellent table that lists and explains the statutes and rules of each
jurisdiction as to the various phases of spousal competency and privileged communica-
tions).
23 Reeves v. Herr, 59 Ill. 81 (1871) (the court held that the privilege is not confined
to subjects which are confidential in their nature, but includes any matter which comes'
to the knowledge of one of the spouses in consequence of the marital relation); Dunn v.
Heasley, 375 Ill. 43, 30 N.E.2d 628 (1940) (a grantee can object to testimony of the wife
as to conversations with her deceased husband regarding the deed, this case construed
the statute as a rule of limited incompetency); Heineman v. Herman, 385 Ill. 191, 52
N.E.2d 263 (1943) (this case holds that all knowledge gained through the marital relation-
ship is privileged).
24 395 Ill. 437, 70 N.E.2d 617 (1947).
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nized that only confidential communications between the spouses during
coverture are privileged communications.
Finally, in The People v. Palumbo,25 in which Section 155 of Ch. 38
was construed,26 the Illinois Supreme Court held that "any communica-
tion" means only a confidential communication. The section of the statute
that was examined by the Court provides in substance that in all criminal
cases, husband and wife may testify for or against each other; provided that
neither may testify to any communication or admission made by either of
them to the other or as to any conversation between them during coverture.
Construing this proviso, the court reached the conclusion that it was the
intention of the Legislature to eliminate the general common law disquali-
fication of husband and wife and to retain only the common law privilege
as it related to confidential communications, 27 a privilege based upon a
desire to preserve the matrimonial relationship by drawing a web of pro-
tection around marital confidences. Reading this case against the historical
background of privileged communications and in light of the modern policy
on the subject of competency of witnesses (the trend is to allow as much
as possible to be admitted into evidence), it can be said that the result
obtained was a sound one.
Whereas confidentiality is a requisite to the privilege,28 all marital com-
munications are presumed confidential and the burden of rebutting this
presumption is on the party who seeks to admit such testimony.29 The party
asserting that the privilege is not applicable in a specific instance must
satisfy the court that under the circumstances grounds for exclusion of the
testimony do not exist. If the court determines that the requisite confiden-
25 5 Ill. 2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955) (The wife was allowed to testify that her
husband told her in the presence of a third person to get a package of narcotics from
their bedroom; the court held that the presence of a known third party negated that
confidentiality which the common law considered as a prerequisite to a privileged com-
munication). See Note, 33 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 282 (1955).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 155 (1966).
27 8 Wigmore § 2336.
28 8 Wigmore § 2332. Dean Wigmore gives the following four principles as the basis
of the privilege of confidential communications between spouses:
1) The communications must originate in confidence.
2) This confidence is essential to the marital relationship.
3) The relation (marital relation) is the proper object of encouragement by the law.
4) The injury that could inure to the relationship by disclosure of the confidential
communication is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial
investigation of the truth.
29 Married people seldom preface their conversations with express injunctions of
secrecy, so that it would seem proper to presume all marital communications by implica-
tion are confidential and that the contrary intention must be shown by the circumstances
of a given instance. 8 Wigmore § 2336, See also Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332
(1951) (petitioner, a witness before a grand jury, refused to tell where his wife was hiding;
the Court held that the petitioner did not have the burden of showing that the com-
munication from his wife was conveyed to him in confidence, that is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the government failed to rebut; therefore, the petitioner was privileged not
to tell where his wife was hiding),
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tiality does not exist, the privilege is wholly inapplicable and both spouses
and any third party may testify as to the contents of the communication.
STATEMENTS MADE IN PRESENCE OF A KNOWN THIRD PARTY
The privilege of confidential communications cannot be claimed in
court for statements made in the presence of a known third person, 0 for in
such a case, the very presence of a known third person negates confiden-
tiality.8 ' If the court makes the determination that the requisite confiden-
tiality is not present, both the communicatee and the known third party
may testify as to the communication. 32 This rule is applied almost without
exception when the known third party is not an immediate member of the
communicator's family; when the known third party is a child of the com-
municator, the courts will generally look to the age and comprehension of
the child,38 permitting the privilege to be exercised when the child is
thought to be incapable of comprehending what was said between the
spouses, or is incompetent as a witness.8 4 The reason for this is to place the
responsibility of maintaining the confidence where it properly belongs, on
the spouses. The effect of the rule is not to inhibit communications between
30 People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill. 2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955) (the husband in the
presence of a known third party asked his wife to get a package of narcotics from their
bedroom; the third party, who was a police informer, was allowed to testify since the
husband, by asking his wife to get the package of narcotics in the presence of the known
third party, waived the requisite confidentiality); People v. McNanna, 94 Ill. App. 2d 314,
236 N.E.2d 769 (1968) (statement made by the defendant to his wife in a tavern regarding
his intention to burn everything she loved was not confidential and was admissible in
an arson prosecution of the defendant; the conversation took place in a public establish-
ment at a table where the wife was seated between the defendant and his sister, thus
showing that the conversation was not intended to be confidential).
31 8 Wigmore § 2332-2341, Pereria v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
31 8 Wigmore § 2332-2341; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
mail fraud and his conviction was reversed on account of his wife being permitted to
testify against him. Under a federal statute allowing recovery, he brought an action for
damages, which required a certificate of innocence in order for him to succeed. The
court denied the certificate of innocence. The communication to which his wife testified
was admissible and unprivileged because he spoke to his wife in the presence of a known
third party, a mailman, and therefore the communication was not confidential). This
rule also applies to documents, see State v. Fiddler, 57 Wash. 2d 815, 360 P.2d 155 (1961)
(the court held that the husband-defendant's letter to his wife, who was unable to read,
was intended to be read by others and therefore was not a confidential communication).
83 Master v. Master, 223 Md. 618, 166 A.2d 251 (1960) (statements made by husband
to wife in the presence of children old enough (age not given) to understand fully what
was being said, were not confidential).
34 Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 130 N.E. 220 (1921) (the admisaion of a con-
versation between the spouses in the presence of their daughter, the eldest being nine
years old, was not improper, it being necessary for the trial court to determine whether
the eldest daughter was of sufficient intelligence at the time of the conversation to pay
attention and understanding what was being said). But cf. Jacobs v. Hester, 113 Mass. 157
(1873) (neither husband nor wife was permitted to testify regarding their private conver-
sations held in the presence of their five children, the eldest being eleven years of age).
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the spouses, but only to guard against the carelessness of the spouses in
allowing others to hear what is purported to be confidential. 85
THiiR PARTY NOT KNOWN To BE PRESENT
The case law holds that the privilege of confidential communications
is not available to withhold testimony of an unknown third person who
has overheard, either accidentally or by eavesdropping, an oral communi-
cation between a husband and wife 0 or who has intercepted a letter from
one spouse intended for the other spouse.87 However, the privilege of
confidential communications will not be considered lost if the eavesdropper,
as to the oral communication, ss or the interceptor of the letter s 9 was facili-
tated in his task by the betrayal or connivance of the spouse to whom the
communication was directed.4 0 The betraying spouse would, of course, not
be allowed to testify against the wishes of the communicator, since the
privilege is retained by the communicator. In addition, the court will
prevent the unknown third party from testifying in order that the betraying
spouse not be able to accomplish by indirection that which he cannot do
directly. 41
An eavesdropper or interceptor, provided that he was not aided by the
35 People v. Lewis, 136 N.Y. 633, 32 N.E. 1014 (1892), State v. Wilkins, 72 Ore. 77,
142 P. 589 (1914).
86 State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950) (in prosecution for buying,
receiving or aiding in concealing certain personalty, court affirmed and held that admis-
sion of police officer's testimony regarding conversation overheard by him in adjoining
hotel room between defendant and wife was proper). Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co.,
106 W. Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929) (testimony of unknown third party overhearing a
conversation between husband and wife that was intended to be confidential held admis-
sible over the objection of the communicating spouse).
37 Batchelor v. State, 217 Ark. 340, 230 S.W.2d 23 (1950) (letter to wife by defendant-
husband, intercepted by prison guard); People v. Dunnigan, 163 Mich. 349, 128 N.W. 180
(1910) (a person entered the prisoner's cell to cut his hair and then promised to take a
letter to the prisoner's wife, but delivered it instead to the Sheriff); Connella v. Teu., 16
Okla. 365, 86 P. 72 (1906) (letter from defendant to wife sent by messenger but intercepted
by Sheriff).
38 Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (husband suing wife for
divorce offered into evidence recordings of their private conversations in bed; the tape
recorder was operated by the plaintiff's son on orders from the plaintiff, without the
wife's knowledge; held privileged communication).
39 McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 637, 155 S.E. 452 (1930) (husband's letters were given to
a third person by the wife); Scott v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 511, 23 S.W. 219 (1895) (letter
by husband to wife voluntarily surrendered by wife to a third party); Wilkerson v. State,
916 A. 729 17 S.E. 990 (1893) (letter from husband to wife given by the wife to her lover;
held inadmissible against the husband). But cf. People v. Jwaile, 12 Cal. App. 192, 107
P. 134 (1909) (jailer requested husband to send a letter to his wife, and the wife at the
jailer's request gave it to him; held admissible); State v. Sepinger, 25 S.D. 110, 125 N.W.
879 (1910) (husband wrote a letter to wife while in jail and she, in turn, delivered it to
the State's Attorney, held admissible). Uniform Rules of Evidence 28(1) is in agreement.
40 McCormick § 86.
41 Ibid.
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communicator, may testify as to the content of the confidential message
because the holder of the privilege (the communicator) does not have a
privilege to suppress testimony of third persons, 42 though the privilege be-
tween the spouses still survives. 43 Some courts allow the unaided third party
to testify on the basis of a lack of confidentiality; but whatever be the
rationale, the eavesdropper or interceptor cannot testify when he has been
assisted by the spouse receiving the confidential message.
Since the communicating spouse can take precautions against oral com-
munications being overheard or written communications being intercepted,
the communicator should bear the risk of failure to use the appropriate
precautions. 44
DISCLOSURE BY ONE SPOUSE TO ANOTHER PERSON
If the communicatee of a confidential communication reveals the con-
tents of the communication inadvertently to a third person, the rules that
apply to an unknown third party are applicable and the third person may
testify as to what was told him by mistake.45 The mistake by the com-
municatee does not negate the confidentiality of the communication be-
tween the spouses; therefore, the communicatee (the spouse who revealed
the confidential communication) will not be allowed to testify.46
On the other hand, if the disclosure by the spouse was made purpose-
fully, this malicious disclosure is thought of as an attempt to circumvent the
privilege, and the third person will not be permitted to testify since the
disclosing spouse should not be allowed to do indirectly what she cannot
do directly. 47
ACTS As CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
One of the most perplexing problems is whether the privilege of confi-
dential communications includes acts as well as words. The cases are divided
on this point; a substantial number say that only communicative acts, acts
that communicate a message to the other spouse, are privileged.48 The
42 Hendrix v. State, 200 Ark. 973, 141 S.W.2d 852 (1940), Commonwealth v. Griffith,
110 Mass. 181 (1872), Ray v. State, 38 Ga. App. 202, 143 S.E. 603 (1928).
43 Ibid.
44 Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S.W. 460, 461 (1906) (comparison of the
husband-wife privilege to the attorney-client privilege as to which ". . . (I)t has been said
that if persons wish the communications they have with their attorneys to be kept secret,
they should be careful not to make them in the hearing of others a. . .'); 8 Wigmore,
§§ 2336, 2339 (1). Professor McCormick would allow the privilege if the husband and wife
have taken all the reasonable precautions to insure that they are not being overheard.
McCormick (86), Uniform Rules of Evidence 28 (1) is similar.
45 See 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 206, 225 (1961).
4G 8 Wigmore § 2339 (2).
47 Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951); noted, 50 Mich. L. Rev.
933 (1952).
48 An example of an act clearly intended to be a confidential communication is: a
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rationale for this is that the confidence the spouses desire from each other
and the freedom from apprehension which the privilege is designed to serve
should apply equally to communicative conduct as well as verbal com-
munications.4 9 An equal or greater number of courts have construed their
respective statutes50 to extend the privilege to acts, facts, and conditions
which, strictly speaking, are not communications (neither utterances nor
communicative acts), but which have come to the knowledge of one of the
spouses only because of the confidence of the marital relationship.5 1 This
is the better view, since it does more to foster confidence in the marital
relationship. Yet this view has been severely criticized by several noted
writers in the field.52
The privilege will not be extended to encompass a spouse who per-
forms an act without knowing that he was being observed by the other
spouse and consequently at the time of performance had no intention to
convey knowledge of the act to anyone, especially the unknown observant. 53
On the other hand, all acts which are clearly intended to be confidential
are privileged. For example, if the actor-spouse is aware that the other
spouse is watching and still makes no attempt to conceal the performance
husband brings home a package and calling his wife's attention, says, "Note where I
place this package," as he places it in the top drawer of his desk. He communicates to her
not only the words, but also the act of placing the package in the top drawer of his desk.
8 Wigmore § 2337.
49 8 Wigmore § 2337.
50 In Illinois the two statutes are Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 155 (1966) and Ill. Rev.
Stat. Ch. 51, § 5 (1966). These statutes do not mention acts as privileged communications;
they only state that admissions, communications, and conversations are privileged.
51 Griffith v. Griffith, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896) (suit for divorce upon grounds
of impotency; the husband's former wife held incompetent to testify as to acts of self-
abuse by husband, learned as a result of her observations); Monaghan v. Green, 265 Ill.
233, 106 N.E. 792 (1914) (in a will contest the court held that the widow of the testator
was not a competent witness to testify that the testator was often intoxicated and had
made two wills because her testimony would concern conversations, facts and circum-
stances that occurred during the marital relationship and the knowledge of which she
obtained only by means of such a relationship). But cf. United States v. Mitchell, 137
F.2d 1006 (1943) (prosecution for violation of the Mann Act; held wife's testimony as to
husband's act of taking money from her not priviliged); Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d
57 (1958) (the court stated that the privilege of communications between a husband and
wife generally extends only to utterances and not to acts); Posner v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 56 Ariz. 202, 106 P.2d 488 (1940) (ex-husband's testimony that he purchased drugs for
the plaintiff and saw her make tests of her urine, not privileged).
52 McCormick states that all extensions beyond communications seem to be unjusti-
fied, McCormick § 83. Dean Wigmore would prefer restricting the privilege to cover only
communicative acts, not all acts performed in the presence of a known spouse which the
majority of jurisdictions hold to be privileged. 8 Wigmore § 2337.
53 Smith v. Smith, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926) (murder prosecution; the husband
dropped a trunk into an outdoor toilet; the trunk contained the body of his mother-in-
law. At the time, the defendant-husband was unaware that his wife saw him perform the
act; the court held that the act was not a confidential communication because there was
no intent to perform the act in reliance upon the confidential nature of the marriage
relationship).
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of the act, it is implied that the actor-spouse intended that the knowledge of
the act be confidential, and the privilege will attach.54
A similar problem arises with respect to one spouse's knowledge of the
other's physical state or condition. Here the result is dependent on whether
the disclosure is voluntary, and thereby within the marital relationship, or
the disclosure is involuntary to the extent that any attempt to conceal it
would fail and thereby it is not privileged.55
Any attempt to formulate a precise test to apply to specific acts in order
to determine whether they are confidential communications would be im-
practical and would unduly burden the court. It can be noted that the
salient feature to look for in an act is the intention of the actor, i.e. whether
the actor placed any reliance or trust upon the observing spouse, since
confidentiality in acts, as well as communications, is a prerequisite to the
privilege attaching.56
OPERATIVE SPAN OF THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege is created to encourage marital confidence and trust;
therefore, in order for the communication to be privileged, the communica-
tion must have been made during the existence of a valid marital relation.5
Validly contracted common law marriages are treated the same as cere-
monial marriages; confidential communications made while the common
law marriage exists are privileged. 58 There is no privilege as to transactions
54 People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949) (the husband, a policeman,
was charged with theft. The wife's testimony as to her husband's acts in her presence of
bringing home the loot and secreting it all over the house held to be a privileged com-
munication): Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 90, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949) (wife was not per-
mitted to testify that she saw her husband leave home before the robbery, return with a
revolver, and later drive with her to where he hid the stolen safe).
55 United States v. Giuteau, 12 D.C. (1 Markey) 498, 547-48 (1882) which states the
rule: "A physical state or condition that is involuntary is not privileged communication,
e.g., blindness, insanity, height, weight or loss of limb." In this case, testimony as to in-
sanity was held not privileged, since the actions which tended to show the person insane
are not a matter of choice or volition); In Re Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 P.
942 (1903) (husband's intoxication in presence of wife held not to be a confidential com-
munication). But cf. Schreffler v. Chase, 245 Ill. 395, 92 N.E. 272 (1910) (probate of the
wife's will; husband's testimony for the contestant as to wife's insane conduct held to be
privileged); Donnan v. Donnan, 256 Ill. 244, 99 N.E. 931 (1912) (will contest, widow's testi-
mony as to the testator's physical condition not admissible).
56 State v. Robbins, 35 Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950) (the husband waited in a
public place in a stolen auto while his wife went inside to procure license plates; the
court held that the wife could not testify as to the stolen car, even though many people
saw the husband waiting in the car, since he did so only because he trusted that his wife
would not disclose that the car was stolen. It is obvious that he would not have waited in
the auto had he not relied upon the confidence engendered between them by reason of
the marital relation).
57 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, adhered to 138 F.2d 831, certiorari denied;
Mitchell v. United States, 321 U.S. 794, rehearing denied, 322 U.S. 768.
58 See Brown v. State, 208 Ga. 304, 66 S.E.2d 745 (1951); People v. Woltering, 275
N.Y. 51, 9 N.E.2d 744 (1937).
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or conversations which occurred before the marriage of the parties in-
volved,5 9 nor is the claim of privilege available where the marriage is void
because one of the parties had been previously married to another person
who is still living and not divorced.60
A communication made during a purported marriage later annulled
for fraud has been held to be privileged as to the victim of the fraud. 61
What of a husband and wife who are living apart? Most courts hold
that the privilege should not apply where the parties are living separately
under decree of the court because the spouse making the communication is
purported to be hostile to the other spouse. 62 Where the separation has not
been ordered by a court decree and the confidential communication was
made to the spouse in hope of reconciliation, it will probably be held to be
a privileged communication.6 3
Both under the common law and under the statutes, 64 the incompetency
of a spouse to testify concerning confidential communications made during
coverture is not terminated with the dissolution of the marriage relation
either by death 65 or divorce. 66 Nevertheless, it would sometimes be unjust
59 Knights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N.E. 377 (1921) (in a suit by a widow for
dower in property transferred by the husband prior to marriage, where defendants were
defending as grantees under a deed from the husband's trustee, the widow was competent
to testify as to transactions and conversations occurring prior to the marriage). Accord,
Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622, 40 Am. R. 617 (1882).
60 Cole v, Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703 (1894) (court held that where there is posi-
tive proof by other witnesses that a man's former wife was living when he contracted a
second marriage, the second wife is competent to prove admissions made by him to her
during their cohabitation to the effect that he had never been divorced from his first
wife). Other jurisdictions sometimes uphold the privilege where the result is to penalize
the active, knowing bigamist. Thomas v. Thomas Estate, 64 Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 (1902)
(where the opposite means are necessary to punish the intentional bigamist, the privilege
has been disallowed); People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (1958).
61 People v. Godines, 17 Cal. App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (1936) (perjury against the
wife; testimony of the husband found to be properly excluded, as to a letter written him
by the accused during the purported marriage, even though the marriage was annulled
prior to trial).
62 McEntire v. McEntire, 107 Ohio St. 510, 140 N.E. 328 (1923) (communications be-
tween separated husband and wife as to a property settlement held admissible and not
privileged). Symington v. Symington, 215 App. Div. 553, 214 N.Y.S. 307 (1st Dept. 1926),
(letters from the husband to the wife during period of separation prior to filing of divorce
action were held not privileged).
63 People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y. 2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 499 (1959) (wife had husband charged
with sexual assault on his own child; he was arrested and moved out of the family home;
later he confessed over the phone to his wife; this alleged confession was found to be a
confidential communication because part of an attempted reconciliation).
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 155 (1966); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (1964).
65 Geer v. Goudy, 174 Ill. 514, 51 N.E. 623 (1898) (wife attempted to take an oral
contract out of the Statute of Frauds; court held a wife cannot testify as to declarations
by or conversations with her husband during coverture, although the marriage relation
was severed by the death of her husband). Accord, First National Bank of Princeton v.
Kurtz 22 Ill. App. 213 (2d Dist. 1886).
66 Heineman v. Heineman, 385 Il. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263 (1944) (divorced wife of party
to action prosecuted by heir was incompetent to testify to alleged agreement between
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not to recognize exceptions to this rule, Even though the spouse entitled to
the privilege is deceased, the surviving spouse should be allowed to waive
the privilege in two instances: (1) in the interest of the deceased spouse;
or (2) for the exoneration of the surviving spouse. 67 If this flexibility is
allowed, many occasions of hardship can be avoided.
WAIVER
A statute embodying a rule as to confidential communications between
husband and wife does not create an absolute incompetency, but only a
privilege.68 An absolute incompetency cannot be waived, 69 whereas a privi-
lege may be waived by the holder of it.70 The ability to waive the privilege
as to confidential communications belongs to the communicating spouse;71
the addressee of the communication is not entitled to object.72 This is the
majority rule and appears to be the best rule, since the privilege is designed
to secure freedom from apprehension in the mind of the spouse making the
communication, it is only natural that the communicator be the holder of
the privilege.73
The communicating spouse (the holder of the privilege) may waive the
privilege by directly stating so or by implication. The courts are extremely
prone to conclude that the holder of the privilege has impliedly waived it;74
deceased and husband occurring before divorce and which wife knew by virtue of the
marriage relation). In accord, People v. Rodgers, 348 Ill. 322, 180 N.E. 856 (1932), Ohio
Ice Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 461, 127 N.E. 743 (1920); Monaghan v. Green,
265 Ill. 233, 106 N.E. 792 (1914).
67 8 Wigmore § 2341.
68 People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill. 2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955) (the court construed Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 155 (1966) and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (1966) as eliminating the
marital incompetency completely, leaving only a husband-wife privilege against disclo-
sure of confidential communications between them).
69 2 Wigmore § 604.
70 Ibid.
71 8 Wigmore § 2340 (1); the Illinois statute fails to designate the person by whom
the privilege may be asserted; but Cleary, in construing the statute, follows Dean Wigmore
in stating that since the privilege is to encourage communications without apprehension,
it is only sound reasoning that the privilege belongs to the communicator. Cleary, Hand-
book of Illinois Evidence § 10:12 (2d ed. 1963). Also in accord are the Uniform Rules of
Evidence 28 (1) and the Model Code of Evidence Rule 214 (c) (1942).
72 Fraser v. U.S., 145 F.2d 139 (1944), cert. denied, Fraser v. Barton, 324 U.S. 849
(1945); 8 Wigmore § 2340.
73 People v. McCormick, 278 App. Div. 191, 194, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 (1951),
. (T)he conjugal privilege belongs not to the witness, but to the spouse against whom
the testimony is offered.').
74 Proffitt v. U.S., 264 F. 299 (1920) (a narcotics case, where the witness failed to make
a timely objection and was impeached by his wife's testimony, which revealed an other-
wise confidential communication); People v. Jones, 217 Mich. 641, 187 N.W. 386 (1922)
(when the defendant called his wife to testify in his behalf, the court held that he waived
his privilege as to confidential communications brought out on cross-examination); Barber
v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903) (if no objection is made at trial, error in the
admission of confidential communication between husband and wife cannot be success-
fully urged in the appeal); People v. Kroyer, 37 Cal. Rptr. 593, 390 P.2d 369 (1964) (court
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when the holder himself ceases to treat a matter as confidential, it should,
as a matter of course, lose its confidential character. 75
The old Illinois statutes76 apparently did not allow waiver by the
communicating spouse,77 for the old proviso stated ". .. that nothing in this
section shall be construed to authorize or permit any such husband or wife
to testify to any admissions .... " The change in this proviso in the new
statutes78 allows the court to permit the communicating spouse to waive
the privilege.
Once the privilege as to confidential communications is waived, the
waiver extends to the entire transaction7 9 and it cannot be limited to a
particular part of the transaction or to a particular person involved.8 0 But
a waiver of the privilege may be recalled at any time before it is acted
upon.sl
COMMENT ON THE EXERCISE OF THE PRIVILEGE
When the privilege of confidential communications has been invoked
by the holder, the issue of whether comment about the exercise of the
privilege is proper arises. The majority of decisions holds that no- comment
regarding the privilege can be made.8 2 But the person desiring the addressee
of the privileged communication to testify can place him or her on the
witness stand and call for testimony, thereby forcing the communicator (the
holder of the privilege) to exercise the privilege in the courtroom and
within the jury's hearing. This causes an adverse inference to be drawn
held that if a spouse's privilege against disclosure by the other spouse of a confidential
communication is to be relied upon, it must be raised at trial; otherwise, the spouse who
holds the privilege has impliedly waived it).
75 Tribado v. Brees, 212 So. 2d 61 (1968) (court held that where husband voluntarily
and without objection testified on deposition as to privileged communications with his
wife, the communications lost their confidential character and the privilege was waived).
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (1933) pertained to civil cases and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,
§ 734 (1933) dealt with criminal cases.
77 Marks v. Madsen, 261 Ill. 51, 103 N.E. 625 (1913); 8 Wigmore § 2340.
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 155 (1966) and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (1966); both state
that husband or wife may testify for or against each other except as to confidential com-
munications, admissions and connversations made during coverture except in enumerated
cases where they may testify. Nowhere in the two statutes does it state that waiver is
not allowed nor can any implications be drawn against waiver. See 30 Ill. L. Rev. 783
(1936).
79 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 230 S.W.2d 184 (1950).
80 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Kaufman, 104 Colo. 13, 87 P.2d 758 (1939).
81 Donovan v. Donovan, 231 Iowa 14, 300 N.W. 656 (1941).
82 Mash v. People, 220 Ill. 86, 77 N.E. 92 (1906) (in a prosecution for keeping a house
of prostitution, prosecuting attorney drew an inference from the defendant's wife not
testifying, held to be an improper comment, but excused by the defendant attorney's prior
similar impropriety); People v. Kloe, 32 Cal. 2d 658, 197 P.2d 705 (1948) (comment held
to be improper, but not prejudicial); Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 (1867) (the privilege
would be entirely destroyed if comment were allowed, therefore, court reversed a larceny
conviction); Uniform Rule of Evidence 39 prohibits comment if the communications
privilege has been claimed.
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by the jury against the holder of the privilege. Looking at this from a
broad perspective, it only seems fair that if the holder of the privilege
desires the communicatee of the confidential communication not to testify,
he must exercise his privilege to accomplish its intended purpose. 83
Although some courts hold unauthorized comment to be ground for
reversible error, the more enlightened courts weigh the seriousness of the
error in light of all circumstances. Since one party may have established
a clear case apart from any benefit derived from the inference raised by
the unauthorized comment, he would be unduly prejudiced by a reversal. 84
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
Like other privileges, the privilege of confidential communications has
its exceptions. The Illinois civil statute85 pertaining to confidential com-
munications between husband and wife lists three exceptions, and the simi-
lar criminal statute86 lists four. The statutory exceptions evolved from the
common law doctrine of necessity, which was devised to avoid extreme
injustice to one of the spouses if his or her testimony were excluded.87 The
common law scholars wanted to prevent the husband from obtaining a
83 People v. Matthews, 359 Il. 171, 194 N.E. 220 (1935) (the state's attorney objected
to a statement by defendant's counsel that defendant's wife could not testify either for or
against him; the reviewing court held that it was not error for the trial judge to remark
in sustaining the objection that the proper method would have been for the defendant
to have offered his wife as his witness and that if the state objected, the court would have
instructed the jury that the wife was not a competent witness). People v. Chand, 116
Cal. App. 2d 242. 253 P.2d 499 (1953) (calling defendant's wife to the stand not improper);
State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So. 2d 574 (1953) (upheld requiring defendant's wife
to appear in court and claim her privilege). But cf. Caldwell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 486,
287 S.W.2d 176 (1959) (error for state to call defendant's wife to witness stand on rebuttal,
thereby forcing defendant to object to her testimony and claim his privilege); State v.
Tanner, 54 Wash. 2d 535, 341 P.2d 869 (1959) (improper for the state to call wife, forcing
the appellant husband to elect whether to object to her testimony before a jury); People
v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702, 328 P.2d 777 (1958) (misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to
offer defendant's wife as a witness thus forcing defendant to object before the jury in
order to assert his privilege). See Note, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 455 (1959).
84 Mash v. People, 220 Ill. 86, 77 N.E. 92 (1906).
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5 (1966) lists three exceptions to the privilege of confiden-
tial communications between the spouses:
1) actions between themselves.
2) actions where the custody or support of their children is directly in issue.
3) matters in which either spouse has acted as the agent for the other.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 155 (1966) lists four exceptions to the privilege of confiden-
tial communications between the spouses:
1) when either spouse is charged with an offense against the person or property of
the other.
2) action for wife abandonment.
3) actions where the interest of the couple's child or children are directly involved.
4) matters in which either spouse has acted as the agent for the other.
87 Bentley v. Cooke, 3 Doug. 422, 424; 99 Eng. Rep. 729 (K.B. 1784) (Mansfield,
L.C.J.): "... (T)hat necessity is not a general necessity, as where no other witness can be
had, but a particular necessity, as where, for instance, the wife would otherwise be ex-
posed without remedy to personal injury." See 8 Wigmore § 2239.
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license enabling him to injure his wife with complete immunity. He would
have had this immunity if his wife were not allowed to testify, by the doc-
trine of necessity, as to injuries inflicted on her by him. The modern statutes
have expanded the common law doctrine of necessity to include not only
actions by one spouse against the other, but for example also actions where
the welfare of the children is at stake and when the wife has acted as an
agent for her husband. The majority of exceptions fall into the following
categories. 88
a) Prosecution for crimes committed by one spouse against the other
or against the children of either.8 9
b) Actions by one of the spouses against a third party for an inten-
tional injury to the marital relation.90
c) Actions by one spouse against the other.91
d) Matters where either has acted as an agent for the other.92
If the confidential communication falls into one of the enumerated
exceptions, the communication is by statute no longer confidential and
either the communicator or the communicatee may testify as to that com-
munication.93
CONCLUSION
The most substantial argument advanced in support of the privilege of
confidential communications is that the privilege encourages marital har-
mony.94 But the fear of courtroom disclosure is almost never in the mind
of the communicator when he or she speaks to the other spouse.95 What
encourages them to fullest frankness is not the assurance of the privilege,
but the trust they place in the loyalty and discretion of each other.96 Most
people never make an appearance in court as a party or witness and the
88 McCormick § 88.
89 People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1951) (in a murder
prosecution, wife's testimony as to assault upon her by defendant-husband before he left
the apartment and committed homicide, admissible).
90 8 Wigmore § 2239 and 6 Wigmore § 1730 (2).
91 People v. Schlette, 139 Cal. App. 2d 165, 293 P.2d 79 (1956) (arson case, wife
eligible to testify against husband since she was joint owner of the property).
92 Robertson v. Brost, 83 Il. 116 (1876) (if a wife makes a contract for her husband as
his agent, she may testify to the contract; otherwise, all the husband would have to do is
to have his wife make all his contracts as his agent).
93 People v. Pittullo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 373, 253 P.2d 705 (1953) (assault by husband
upon wife, held competent to testify); In Re Kellog, 41 Cal. App. 2d 833, 107 P.2d 964
(1940) (theft of husband's funds from a joint account, testimony of the husband admitted),
People v. Malach, 119 Mich. 112, 77 N.W. 638 (1898) (failure to support wife, her testi-
mony allowed).
94 McCormick § 90.
95 Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Re-
lations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929).
96 Supra, note 94.
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anticipation of making one is not one of those factors which materially influ-
ence the communicator of the confidential communication.9 7 Therefore, the
benefits of the privilege are at best doubtful and marginal, while the danger
of injustice from suppression of relevant proof is clear and certain.
The rationale for the privilege of confidential communications is not
the encouragement of marital harmony, but a strong respect for the privacy
of man and wife.98 This is a most noteworthy and decent reason, yet when
balanced against the need for disclosure of all relevant proof in court where
a man's life, liberty, or property may be in issue, the need for full disclosure
weighs more heavily. This reasoning has swayed the courts to limit the
privilege in cases where injustice would result and has resulted in the
formulation of this principle: the scope of the privilege in doubtful cases
should be strictly limited.99
The privilege should be thought of as not an absolute one but as a
qualified one, which will yield if the trial judge finds the evidence of the
communication is required to arrive at a just result.100 The paramount
consideration must be justice for all parties involved, not the blind applica-
tion of a privilege, which by the time the spouses are in court will not
further marital harmony since spouses at that stage have very little, if any,
marital affection.
CHARLES W. JAKOPICH
97 Supra, note 95.
98 Supra, note 94.
99 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415
(1936).
100 Supra, note 94.
